




TUTARE
RISK MANAGEMENT

Country Review - Libya

5th April - 3rd May 2022





LIBYA

RISK RATINGS

LIBYA	POLITICAL STABILITY	INSTITUTIONAL	INFRASTRUCTURE	LABOUR	CRIME	TERRORISM	WAR	CIVIL UNREST	KIDNAP	
	POLITICAL	OPERATIONAL			SECURITY				TRAVEL	
	EXTREME	HIGH			MEDIUM				HIGH	
	E	H	H	H	H	L	L	H	M	H

OVERVIEW

COVID-19

<https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/libya/>

POLITICAL UPDATES

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Progress on the election process has remained painfully slow and is not expected to see any significant developments soon. The issue of the constitution remains a divisive issue, and a referendum on a constitution acceptable to all social groups remains a prerequisite to successful elections.

The current political situation following the delayed elections and the appointment of an opposing Prime Minister by the HoR has raised the threat of a return to parallel eastern and western-based governments. The development is extremely fluid and is likely to see political uncertainty continue in the short to medium term, thereby impacting national funding of long-term projects. This has already been seen in the O&G and power generation sectors where funding in the former has resulted in the closure of smaller fields and the frequent failure of critical infrastructure.

Significant developments for April 22

GNS Holds first Meeting in Sabha

Between the evening of 16 April and the early morning of 17 April, large militia mobilizations were reported in Tripoli. The mobilizations were caused by rumours about an attempt of Bashaga to enter Tripolitania from Tunisia via the Wazen border crossing. Unconfirmed reports stated Bashaga was going to be met by a convoy under Osama Juwaili at the border crossing. However, the convoy was said to have been stopped by an armed group from Nalut, which disrupted the attempt.

After this new failed attempt to gain access to Tripoli, the GNS held its first government session on 21 April in Sabha. The GNS likely felt the need to start operating to maintain its political credibility. However, operating from outside Tripoli comes with costs. Until the GNS enters Tripoli, it will lack legitimacy and will not take control of key institutions such as the NOC and the Libyan Central Bank. This means the GNS will not be able to consolidate its power by exercising political control

over Libya's financial and natural resources. Until this holds, Bashaga and the GNS will remain hostage to Haftar's de facto authority and Saleh's political leverage, and are unlikely to remove the GNU.

This scenario is far from ideal for Bashaga, it might compel him to adopt a risk seeking behaviour and adopt a bolder strategy to enter Tripoli, even if his level of support in the city is insufficient for a peaceful and smooth takeover. However, in the short term, it is more likely that Bashaga's strategy will remain focused on avoiding a military escalation with the GNU. Before risking a military escalation, it would make sense for Bashaga to wait for the expiry of the GNU's mandate in June and capitalize on the loss of legitimacy that it would entail for PM Dbeiba. In any case, new attempts to enter Tripoli cannot be excluded in the coming weeks, and the GNS activities to win support in the city will continue.

It is interesting to analyse the location in which the GNS held its first meeting, namely Sabha. Sabha is a remote location and far from the main centres of political and economic power in Libya, which are Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi and Tobruk. Below is a list of possible reasons:

- Haftar does not want Bashaga in Benghazi because he sees him as a possible political threat.
- Saleh does not want him in Tobruk for the same reason.
- Bashaga does not want to establish himself in Benghazi or Tobruk, because in such places he would be at the mercy Haftar and Saleh respectively, and enjoy very little freedom of manoeuvre. This matches with previous analysis indicating that Bashaga would struggle to carve out a space of political independence for himself, given his reliance on Saleh and Haftar to back his position as GNS PM.

Williams leads multiple talks aiming at reaching political settlement in Libya.

There remains the possibility that Bashaga decided to hold the first GNS session in Sabha to showcase the extensive territorial control of the eastern bloc in all areas of the country that are not under GNU authority. However, this option currently seems less likely or secondary compared to the other ones listed above. Bashaga currently remains a mere political face for the LNA and the HoR to defy the authority of the GNU.

The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Libya, Stephanie Williams, has recently intensified her moves to reach a consensual constitutional basis for holding the upcoming elections, after her sponsorship of the Cairo meetings between the delegations of House of Representatives (HoR) and High Council of State (HCS) over a period of five days.

Williams held a number of meetings and consultations with all actors in the political scene, where she met with the Head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed Menfi, and his two deputies, Musa Al-Koni, and Abdullah Al-Lafi, accompanied by the acting head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. She expanded the circle of her meetings to include the Prime Minister of the Unity Government, Abdul Al-Hamid Al-Dabaiba, who stressed that the elections are a real goal for his

government, adding that he is working in coordination with the High National Elections Commission in order to prepare for the vote if the constitutional basis is approved.

The efforts exerted by Williams came in light of the crisis of closing oil fields and halting exports in some ports, as she stressed the need to refrain from using Libyan oil as a weapon for political purposes, calling, during a phone call with Libyan Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha, for an end to the oil closure, and confirmed that she had agreed with him that oil revenues are the lifeblood of Libyans and must be managed in a fully transparent and accountable manner, as well as distributed fairly among all Libyans.

OIL & GAS UPDATES

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Stephanie Williams urges Government to insulate oil from politics

UN special adviser Stephanie Williams, has called for lifting the oil blockade, stressing the need to insulate Libya's oil production from being weaponized for political purposes. This came during her phone call with the parallel government's Prime Minister, Fathi Bashagha, to discuss the outcomes of consultations held from 13-18 April in Cairo with the Joint Committee consisting of members from the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of States (HCS). "We agreed that oil revenues, which serve as a lifeline for the Libyan people, must be managed in an entirely transparent and accountable fashion and be equitably distributed among all Libyans", Williams tweeted. "I also emphasized the need to maintain absolute calm on the ground in light of the increasing political polarization in the country", she added.

Is An End to Libya's Oil Shutdowns in Sight?

The importance of Libyan crude oil output and of no additional serious geopolitical disruption adding to the volatility component in oil pricing was highlighted in the recent strong statements from the U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland. He urged the country's central bank to safeguard oil revenue from misappropriation, and called for a resolution to the loss of around 550,000 barrels per day (bpd) of its oil production as a result of blockades on major fields and export terminals. In terms of the oil shutdown logistics, last week saw the closure of a second export terminal, the 60,000 bpd Brega operation, by Libya's National Oil Corporation. This followed the previous closure of the Zueitina port, whose crude loadings average around 90,000 bpd, with production also stopped at Abuatufol, Al-Intisar, Anakhla, and Nafura. Just prior to this, the Sharara field in the west of the country, which can pump around 300,000 bpd, was also shut down and just prior to this the El Feel oil field, which produces 70,000 bpd, was closed. These sites are key suppliers of mostly high-quality light, sweet crude oil, notably including the Es Sider and Sharara export crudes that are particularly in demand in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe for their gasoline and middle distillate yields. These shutdowns, in turn, followed the NOC declaring a legal state of 'force majeure' because, according to the company: "It is impossible to implement its commitments towards the oil market."

The force majeure declared on various key oil sites and installations is a result of the latest political in-fighting between Libya's various political, military, and commercial interests, with this one centred on the supporters of the interim government of sitting Prime Minister, Abdulhamid Dbeibah, against those of former interior minister Fathi Bashagha. These two groups broadly align to the two rival power groupings that emerged after the parliament appointed a new prime minister

in February, in a direct challenge to the U.N.-brokered government in the capital Tripoli. The specific groups that have been blocking the oil facilities most recently demand a fair distribution of crude oil income and the transfer of power to Bashagha.

The Oil Blockade

On 16 April, protesters closed the Zueitina oil terminal, demanding the GNU to hand over power to the GNS. The NOC declared force majeure at the facility on 18 April.

- On 17 April, the NOC also declared force majeure at Mellitah oil complex, after protesters disrupted oil operations at the El Feel Oilfield.
- On 17 April, locals from Awbari and Tebu and Tuareg tribesmen announced to have halted oil operations at El Sharara oilfield. The NOC declared force majeure at the facility on 18 April.
- On 19 April, the NOC declared force majeure at Brega oil port due to operational disruptions.
- Disruption of operations also reported in Hariga port, possible declaration of force majeure in the upcoming days.

The blockade is likely linked to the LYD 8 billion transfer that the NOC granted to the GNU on 14 April. This is seen by the GNS as a key enabler that will allow Dbeiba to keep buying the allegiance of Tripoli-based militias. The enforcement of the eastern-backed oil blockade is meant to undermine the capability of the GNU to buy support. The above confirms previous about a possible oil blockade in the short term. The eastern bloc might keep the blockade in place for an extended period of time, for its effects to be felt in Tripoli and among key power brokers. This would put considerable domestic and international pressure on Dbeiba

SUMMARY

Do not travel to Libya due to COVID-19, crime, terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping, and armed conflict.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has issued a Level 4 Travel Health Notice for Libya due to COVID-19, indicating a very high level of COVID-19 in the country. Your risk of contracting COVID-19 and developing severe symptoms may be lower if you are fully vaccinated with an FDA authorized vaccine. Before planning any international travel, please review the CDC's specific recommendations for vaccinated and unvaccinated travellers.

Terrorist groups continue plotting attacks in Libya. Violent extremist activity in Libya remains high, and extremist groups have made threats against officials and citizens. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, hotels, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, and government facilities. Outbreaks of violence between competing armed groups can occur with little warning. The capital, Tripoli, and other cities, such as Surman, Al-Jufra, Misrata, Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Sabha, and Derna, have witnessed fighting among armed groups, as well as terrorist attacks.

Hotels and airports frequented by Westerners have been the targets of these attacks. Even demonstrations intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational and escalate into violence. Militia or armed groups sometimes detain travellers for arbitrary reasons, do not grant detainees access to a lawyer or a legal process, and do not allow detainees to inform others of their status.

If you decide to travel to Libya:

- Always carry proof of citizenship and valid immigration status.
- Avoid demonstrations and crowds.
- Make contingency plans to leave.
- Consider consulting with a professional security organization.
- Develop a communication plan with family and/or your employer or host organization.

POLITICAL RISK

OVERVIEW

Libya has a temporary constitution, the (amended) Temporary Constitutional Declaration (TCD) of August 2011. This constitution, as its name clearly indicates, was meant to be the interim rules of the political game during the revolution. It was a statement of intent, social contract, by the temporary unelected political leadership of the time (the unelected National Transitional Council -NTC) with the rest of the population until elections were held. Elections were indeed held in 2012 leading to Libya's first post-Qaddafi parliament: the General National Congress (GNC). The main task of the GNC was to approve a permanent constitution and organise elections. However, armed militias, and the intoxicating effect of post-Qaddafi power and freedom meant the GNC, the militias, and probably the public at large too, lost sight of the goal of the constitution and elections and fought over influence, power, and rentier state booty. Things quickly spiralled out of control.

POLITICAL STABILITY

On the eve of the 11th anniversary of the 17 February 2011 revolution that ended the 42-year Qaddafi regime, Libya is still seeking what now seems an unattainable political stability. Two elections and several recognized and unrecognized, interim, and designate, unparalleled, and paralleled prime ministers later – Libya is still searching for stability. It is still trying to agree a permanent constitution based on which it would hold elections. And it is still trying to organize elections seven years since the last elections of 2014. It seems that the threat of Libyan elections in December last year, or soon afterwards, had a centrifugal effect on Libyan politics. There is a fear of elections and the change it might bring and the forthcoming political unknown by the status quo stakeholders who fear losing power or even being vulnerable to prosecution or persecution after any elections that may sweep the old political guard aside.

The Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Libya, Stephanie Williams, has stated that their priority is to help the Libyans conduct elections as soon as possible based on a constitutional basis and an electoral framework. In a direct dialogue with the Libyans via the Libyan Dialogue platform, Williams added that she hopes to hold a meeting that includes the House of Representatives and the High Council of State in the near future. She also stressed that the door is open to any mediation facilitated by the United Nations, confirming the need to maintain the military track and the ceasefire to keep the 5 + 5 Joint Military Commission away from political fluctuations.

OPERATIONAL RISK

OVERVIEW

Libya, a country located in North Africa, is bordered by Egypt to the east, Sudan to the southeast, Chad and Niger to the south, Algeria and Tunisia to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea to the north. Libya gained its independence in 1951. Libya's capital is Tripoli, and its official language is Arabic (although many Libyans also speak English or Italian as a second language). Libya's currency is the Libyan dinar (LYD).

The momentous events of 2011, which resulted in the overthrow of a regime that had been in place for 42 years, has descended into political uncertainty giving rise to security issues. The oil sector, where production is significantly below pre-2011 levels, remains key to a more stable and peaceful future.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Lacking stability in politics and social structure, Libya is a state susceptible to widespread volatility. Its economy is no exception. Developing infrastructure in Libya is key to rebuilding its economy.

Before the 2011 Arab Spring Revolution, Libya exported large quantities of oil to China, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Turkey, among other countries. In 2010, Libya had a GDP of \$74.76 billion, while Tunisia, a bordering state, had a GDP of \$44.43 billion. Following the death of Muammar Gaddafi in late 2011, the country's GDP fell to \$34.7 billion, almost half that of the previous year.

While Libya exported 1.6 million barrels of oil per day before the revolution in 2010, in August 2016, just over 200,000 barrels per day were exported. This dramatic fall can be traced to considerable damage to oil infrastructure in Libya as a result of rival factions and militias feuding after the Revolution. The power struggles were not only the result of seemingly endless internal instability but also the ongoing proxy wars in the Middle East.

The Minister of Oil and Gas, Mohamed Aoun, has participated in the 27th meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was held via Zoom platform. The participants agreed to continue unwinding production cuts of 43,200 barrels per day during the month of April. This increase was distributed to the countries contributing to the reduction while Libya is excluded from contributing to the reduction.

AVIATION CONCERNS

Several of Libya's international airports are now open, with scheduled and charter flights available from Tripoli's Mitiga Airport (MJI), Misrata (MRA), and Benghazi's Benina Airport (BEN) to destinations in Egypt, Jordan, Malta, Niger, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia. Although they are operational, carriers cancel flights with little notice. Commercial air travel in Libya remains an attractive target for armed groups.

TRADE

Libya's economy is structured primarily around the nation's energy sector, which generates about 95% of export earnings, 80% of GDP, and 99% of government income. Meanwhile, the non-hydrocarbon sectors of the economy remain mostly underdeveloped, and state controlled. The first biggest non-oil export groups of Libya are iron and steel. The second biggest are pearls, metals and precious stones. There is a clear need to diversify the Libyan economy particularly through attracting foreign investment, strengthening the private sector, and expand the export base.

In 2019, Libya GDP was an estimated \$33.0 billion (current market exchange rates); real GDP was up by an estimated 9.9%; and the population was 7 million. (Source: IMF). Libya is 82nd largest goods trading partner with \$1.9 billion in total (two way) goods trade during 2019. Goods exports totalled \$412 million; goods imports totalled \$1.5 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Libya was \$1.1 billion in 2019. <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/middle-eastnorth-africa/libya>

On 21 Nov 2021, The American Chamber of Commerce in Libya (AmCham Libya) hosted the first U.S. business delegation in Libya in ten years. The delegation included representatives of Bechtel, Caterpillar, GE, Hill and Pratt and Whitney. Making the keynote speech at the event, Economy Minister Mohamed Hwej apologised for arriving late saying it was the traffic and that Libya needed more roads. Hwej insisted that Libya needed to build a state before it can improve security and then build an economy. He hoped the upcoming elections planned for 24 December 2021 would start this process. <https://www.libyaherald.com/2021/11/amcham-libya-hosts-first-u-s-trade-mission-in-tripoli-in-ten-years/>

WATER QUALITY

Libya is a country that suffers from water scarcity. The situation has become more problematic due to continued population growth, low rainfall and higher water demand for agriculture and industrial use. The freshwater in Libya originates from four aquifers: the Kufra, Sirte, Morzuk, Hamada, and the Nubian.

The local authorities have made enormous efforts to address its water deficit problems, mainly through the implementation of "The Man-made River Project". Despite these efforts, the problem of water deficits continues, due to ever increasing water demands. In addition, maintaining the water quality standard is still an issue in the country.

SECURITY RISK

OVERVIEW

The current insecurity and political uncertainty in Libya have compounded other significant domestic obstacles to investment, such as non-tariff barriers, including the country's unwieldy and corrupt bureaucracy; extensive regulation; and a confusing legal system that discriminates against foreigners. Crimes of opportunity, such as theft, burglary, and purse-snatching occur frequently against foreigners. Criminal gangs have perpetrated killings of politicians and civilians without consequence.

CRIME

Militias aligned with western cities as well as forces aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA) have committed extra-judicial killings of politicians and civilians without consequence. Many Libyans have been forcibly disappeared. Journalists and other activists have been the targets of attack, exemplifying the collapse of political expression, press, and free speech.

Expect extensive corruption, and indiscriminate violence against civilians. Libya's judicial system is extremely corrupt. There have been thousands of cases of arbitrary arrests without due process. Armed groups often exercise law enforcement duties as they see fit. Both warring parties practice torture in interment facilities. Prisons are overcrowded and do not provide adequate healthcare services. There have been allegations of unlawful killings, sexual violence, and forced labour in Libyan prisons. Militias (even some controlled by the UN-recognized government) have forced children into conscription.

TERRORISM

Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners. Extremist groups including Daesh (formerly referred to as ISIL) are responsible for the majority of attacks, which have targeted foreign and diplomatic personnel and premises, international hotels, commercial and oil installations, and government and other official security institutions. Although government - aligned forces, supported by U.S. airstrikes, declared the end of operations against Daesh in Sirte in January 2016, Daesh remain a serious threat to security in Libya. AAS-B and AAS-D officially disbanded in 2017, but fighters and local elements remain. Each is a coalition of violent religious extremist groups combating the Libyan House of Representatives-aligned forces.

ISIS-Libya aims to prevent the formation of a reunified Libyan state, secure control over the country's critical resources, and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya. It has been active in Libya since approximately 2015, with its original headquarters in Sirte. ISIS-Libya no longer controls territory in Libya but does maintain a low-profile presence throughout much of the country. Recent ISIS Activity Includes:

ISIS CLAIMS ATTACK ON THE LNA

On 18 April, ISIS claimed a VBIED attack against an LNA base belonging to the Tariq Bin Ziyad (TBZ) in Umm Al Aranib. Initial reports claimed that the attack resulted in the death of at least three LNA Soldiers and the injury of another one. The LNA Director of Moral Guidance Department, Khaled Al-Mahjoub, later denied this claim saying that no fatalities occurred, though he admitted soldiers being injured. Al-Mahjoub added that after the attack an LNA operation resulted in the death of two ISIS militants in Qatrun on 19 April.

The attack is reportedly part of ISIS operation "Revenge for the Two Sheiks," which saw attacks being carried out also in Iraq and Syria almost simultaneously. The attack would serve to avenge the death of the former two ISIS leaders, both killed during security operations. If the above is confirmed, it would indicate increasing ISIS capabilities and intent to attack LNA forces in the short term. Although it is still not clear if the GNS will establish itself in Sabha for an extended period of time, its presence would encourage ISIS attacks in the urban area, where the risk of civilian casualties is higher.

- 1st April 22 – A source said that ISIS targeted a [clinic in Murzuq](#) on Friday morning. The source added that the ensuing clash resulted in the death of one of the attackers.
- 19th – LNA sources claimed that at least two ISIS members were killed during a security operation in the [Qatrun area](#) on Tuesday. Major General Khaled Al-Mahjoub claimed that those killed belonged to a unit under Moataz Ahmed. The incident follows the ISIS-claimed VBIED attack against LNA forces in Umm Al Aranib on 18 April.
- 25th April 22 – A clash broke out between units of the LNA Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and ISIS in the [Ghadduwah area, 65 km south of Sabha](#), on Monday evening. LNA sources claimed that the clash ensued after they monitored the entry of an ISIS cell into the area. The source added that at least two ISIS militants were injured, and several mobile phones and explosives were seized following the clashes.

KIDNAPPING

There remains a continuing high threat of kidnap from criminal groups, armed groups, and terrorist groups across the whole of Libya. Security precautions do not mitigate the threat.

Terrorist groups including Daesh, Al Qaeda and their affiliates routinely use kidnapping as a tactic and are capable of conducting kidnapping across borders. Terrorist groups within Libya have both intent and capability to carry out further kidnappings. It's a realistic possibility that they will target foreign nationals. Criminal gangs also carry out kidnappings, and there's a realistic possibility that they would sell hostages on to terrorist groups. Foreign nationals have been kidnapped in Libya in the last 12 months. Four foreign nationals were kidnapped in south-west Libya in November 2017 and most recently, 4 foreign nationals were kidnapped in south-east Libya in July 2018. See our Sahel page for information on the regional threat.

There is a threat of kidnapping by groups operating in North Africa, particularly from Libya, Mauritania and groups originating in the Sahel. This includes Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQ-IM) and Daesh-affiliated groups, who may travel across the region's porous border. There is a heightened risk of kidnap in border and remote desert areas of North Africa. Terrorist groups have kidnapped foreigners, government officials and civilians in the region for financial gain and for political leverage. Further kidnaps are likely.

Those engaged in tourism, humanitarian aid work, journalism or business sectors are viewed as legitimate targets. If you're kidnapped, the reason for your presence is unlikely to serve as a protection or secure your safe release. Latest Kidnapping events include:

- 3rd April 22 – Units of the Lions of Tajoura kidnapped a merchant in Tajoura on Sunday. The victim, identified as Mohamed Al Jatlawi, came from Misrata. The Lions of Tajoura demanded ransom money in exchange for the release of the victim. The Lions of Tajoura called on the Rahba Al Daraa militia to mediate in the kidnapping but the latter refused.
- 6th April 22 – Sources reported that an eight-year-old girl was kidnapped in Abu Salim, Tripoli, on Wednesday. The kidnappers are now asking a ransom of 20 thousand dinars to the family.
- 7th April 22 – A kidnapping incident was reported in the Mahdia area in Sabha on Thursday. The suspects were later arrested. No further details were provided.
- 9th April 22 – Two soldiers of the 444th Brigade were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen while distributing food at a checkpoint in the Al Hira area, Tripoli, on Saturday. One source claimed that the kidnappers were likely affiliated with human smuggling networks in the area.

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- 15th April 22 – Unidentified gunmen kidnapped the mayor of Zelten early on Friday morning. No further information is currently available.
 - 16th April 22 – A man, affiliated with the Ghneiwa militia, was kidnapped in Ain Zara on Saturday morning. No further details are currently available.
 - 20th April 22 – Sources claim that gunmen kidnapped the medical director of the Al Khadra Hospital in Abu Salim, Tripoli, on Wednesday morning.
 - 20th April 22 – Unidentified gunmen kidnapped a car showroom owner in Surman on Wednesday evening.
 - 20th April 22 – A source claimed that the Head of the Libyan Community in Ukraine was kidnapped in Tripoli on Wednesday. The source added that the kidnapping might have been carried out by a fuel smuggling gang involving Ukrainian citizens.
 - 21st April 22 – Two women were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Benghazi on Thursday early morning. The victims were later rescued after security authorities chased and caught up with the vehicle used by the gunmen.
 - 25th April 22 – On Monday evening, reports indicate that gunmen belonging to the Al-Senussi family from Warshafana kidnapped the brother of 55th Brigade Commander, Muammar Al-Dhawi, Nasser al-Dhawi, near Al Zawiyah. The kidnapping was to demand the release of Bashir and Salah Al-Senussi, said to be detained by the 55th Brigade. Nasser Al-Dhawi was later released following the mediation of notables of the Awlad Saqr. The incident has resulted in the temporary closure of the coastal road near Jaddaim, the mobilization of 55th Brigade forces, and the arrival of the Abu Zreiba forces in support of the 55th Brigade. Initial reports indicated that the Al Far militia was involved in the kidnapping but was later disproved.

DRUG CRIME

Penalties for possessing, using, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Libya are severe; convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences and heavy fines. However, drug sales and use are as prevalent in Tripoli as any other large city due to inconsistent enforcement and the lack of a coherent and professional criminal justice apparatus. Driving under the influence can result in immediate detention. Alcohol is also prohibited in Libya, and possessing, using, or trafficking in alcohol can carry severe penalties.

LAW ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS: SECURITY AGENCIES

During the year, the Government of National Accord (GNA) had limited effective control over security forces, and these forces consisted of a mix of semiregular units, tribal nonstate armed groups, and civilian volunteers. The national police force, which reports to the Interior Ministry, has official responsibility for internal security. The armed forces under the Defense Ministry have the primary mission for external Defense and supported Interior Ministry forces on internal security matters. Civilian authorities have only nominal control of police and the security apparatus, and security-related police work generally falls to disparate informal armed groups, which receive salaries from the government and exercise law enforcement functions without formal training or supervision, and with varying degrees of accountability. Members of security forces have committed numerous abuses.

POLICE RESPONSE

The Government of National Unity (GNU) has various ground, air, naval, and coast guard forces under its command. Libyan National Army (LNA) forces under Khalifa Haftar are a mix of semi-regular military units, tribal militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign-supplied troops.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ROAD SAFETY

There is a high rate of accidents, as authorities often do not enforce traffic laws. Wind-blown sand affects road visibility. Although it doesn't often rain, when it does, the roads flood. Libyan road infrastructure is not in good condition. It is common to find satisfactorily paved roads in urban areas, but many rural roads are unpaved. Roadside assistance is extremely limited and offered only in Arabic. Street signage is rare and usually written in Arabic.

Expect to encounter militia-run checkpoints throughout Libya. Those manning checkpoints have detained people without reason and will not provide access to a lawyer or a judicial process. The State Department has an extremely limited capacity to assist U.S. citizens detained by militia groups. Roads can close with little or no warning. Libya's land borders with Egypt and Tunisia are subject to periodic closures. Short-term closures of other land borders may occur with little notice.

For detailed, country-specific road and vehicle safety information, read the World Health Organization's Global Status Report on Road Safety.

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY

Taxis are available for hire, but drivers are often reckless, untrained, and usually do not speak English. There are some public transportation options, but service is limited.

MARITIME SECURITY

The LNA requires all maritime vessels in Libyan waters to have its permission to transit. Vessels should proceed with extreme caution when approaching all Libyan oil terminals and ports. Seaports can close with little or no warning.

PERSONAL IDENTITY & HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

Human trafficking is a significant issue in Libya. Libyan territory is a transit area for asylum seekers hoping to make it to Europe, but those seeking to escape challenging conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are often forced into prostitution or labour. There have been reports of Libyan brothels procuring Sub-Saharan women from detention centres and pressing them into prostitution.

SAFETY CONCERNS FOR WOMEN TRAVELLERS

There are no reliable statistics on the extent of domestic violence. Social and cultural barriers, including police and judicial reluctance to act and family reluctance to publicize an assault, contribute to lack of effective enforcement. Some local civil society organizations report that women were experiencing higher rates of domestic violence due to COVID-19 curfews and extended confinement at home. Rape survivors who could not meet high evidentiary standards could face charges of adultery. By law, a convicted rapist may avoid a 25-year prison sentence by marrying the survivor, regardless of her wishes, provided her family consents. Migrant women and girls are particularly vulnerable to rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence, including forced prostitution and sexual exploitation in conditions amounting to sexual slavery. There was widespread harassment and intimidation of women by armed groups and terrorists, including harassment and arbitrary detention based on accusations of “un-Islamic” behaviour. Armed groups harass women traveling without a male “guardian.” Armed groups have asked men and women socializing in public venues to produce marriage certificates to verify their relationship.

Consider composite scores given to Libya by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in its Gender Development Index, measuring the difference between average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development, and Gender Inequality Index, measuring inequality in achievement in reproductive health, empowerment, and the labour market.

SAFETY CONCERNS FOR LGBTI+ TRAVELLERS

Societal discrimination against LGBTI+ persons persist, and official discrimination is codified in local interpretations of Sharia law. Convictions of same-sex sexual activity carry sentences of three to five years of imprisonment. The law provides for punishment of both parties. There were reports of physical violence, harassment, and blackmail based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Armed groups often police communities to enforce compliance with their commanders’ understanding of “Islamic” behaviour, harassing, and threatening with impunity individuals believed to have LGBTI+ orientations and their families. The threat of possible violence or abuse could intimidate those who want to report discrimination.

SAFETY CONCERNS FOR TRAVELLERS WITH DISABILITIES

The Constitutional Declaration addresses the rights of persons with disabilities by providing for monetary and other types of social assistance for the “protection” of persons with “special needs” with respect to employment, education, access to health care, and the provision of other government services, but it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination. The government does not effectively enforce these provisions. IDPs, migrants, and refugees with disabilities were especially vulnerable to poor treatment in detention facilities.

Some organizations estimated that up to 13% of citizens may experience some form of physical disability, although GNA estimates were much lower. Years of postrevolutionary conflict also led to a greater incidence of persons maimed by shelling or explosive war remnants.

SAFETY CONCERNS FOR TRAVELLERS BASED ON RACE, RELIGION, & ETHNICITY

Ethnic minorities face societal discrimination and violence. Racial discrimination targets dark-skinned people, including those of sub-Saharan African heritage. Government officials and journalists often distinguish between “local” and “foreign” populations of Tebu and Tuareg in the south, and advocate expulsion of minority groups affiliated with political rivals on the basis they were not truly “Libyan.” Some representatives of minority groups, including representatives of Tebu and Tuareg communities, rejected the 2017 draft constitution because of a perceived lack of recognition of the status of these communities, although the draft explicitly protects the legal rights of minority groups. Tebu and Tuareg communities receive substandard or no services from municipalities, lack national identity numbers, face widespread social discrimination, and suffer from hate speech and identity-based violence. Some members of ethnic minority communities in southern and western Libya reported being unwilling to enter certain courthouses and police stations for fear of intimidation and reprisal. There are regular reports of ethnic minorities being injured or killed in confrontations with other groups.

CONCERNS INVOLVING THE RULE OF LAW, ARBITRARY DETENTION, OFFICIAL HARASSMENT, CORRUPTION &/OR TRANSPARENCY

The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption by officials. The government has not implemented the law effectively, and officials engage in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption during 2020, but, as in 2019, no significant investigations or prosecutions occurred.

The 2011 Constitutional Declaration states that the government shall provide for the fair distribution of national wealth among citizens, cities, and regions. The government struggles to decentralize distribution of oil wealth and delivery of services through regional and local governance structures. There are many reports and accusations of government corruption due to the lack of transparency in the GNA’s management of security forces, oil revenues, and the national economy. There are allegations that GNA officials submitted fraudulent letters of credit to gain access to government funds. The LNA-orchestrated shutdown of the country’s oil sector from January to September 2020 further disrupted the distribution of revenues.

Internal conflict and the weakness of public institutions undermine implementation of the law. Officials frequently engage in corrupt practices with impunity, such as graft, bribery, and nepotism. There are numerous reports of government corruption, including reports that officials engaged in money laundering, human trafficking, and other criminal activities. The government lacks significant mechanisms to investigate corruption among police and security forces.

The Audit Bureau, the highest financial regulatory authority in the country, has made efforts to improve transparency by publishing annual reports on government revenues and expenditures, national projects, and administrative corruption. The Audit Bureau also investigated mismanagement at the General Electricity Company of Libya that had lowered production and led to acute power cuts.

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions [Index](#) ranks Libya 173 out of 180 worldwide, where 1 means most transparent.

COMMUNICATION ISSUES

The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provides for freedom of opinion, expression, and press, but various armed groups, including those aligned with the GNA, exert significant control over media content, and censorship is pervasive. The press has very little freedom in Libya and is controlled heavily by the Libyan government, militias, and Libyan Intelligence Services. Unidentified assailants target journalists and reporters for political views. Press freedoms are limited in all forms of media, creating an environment in which virtually no independent media exists.

The internet in Libya is heavily monitored by the Libyan Government, Militias, and Libyan Intelligence Services. The GNA generally does not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or widely censor online content. Selective filtering or blocking of access does exist, even though no reliable public information identifies those responsible for censorship. There are reports that GNA-aligned groups monitor private online communications without appropriate legal authority.

Facebook pages are regularly hacked by unknown actors or closed due to mass reporting and complaints. Social media, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, play a critical role in official and unofficial government and nongovernmental communications. Facebook remains the main platform government officials, ministries, and armed groups use to transmit information to the public. A significant body of evidence suggests that foreign actors seek to influence domestic opinion and incite violence in the country by spreading deliberate misinformation on social media and other platforms.

Many bloggers, online journalists, and citizens report practicing self-censorship due to intimidation by armed groups and the uncertain political situation.

Freedom of speech does not exist in Libya, and no protections or liberties are given to its citizens or foreign visitors. Freedom of speech is limited in law and practice. The law criminalizes acts that “harm the February 17 revolution of 2011.” The House of Representatives, since its election in 2014, and the GNA, since taking its seat in Tripoli in 2016, have done little to reduce restrictions on freedom of speech. Civil society organizations practice self-censorship because they believe armed groups would threaten or kill activists. Widespread conflict in major urban areas deepen the climate of fear and provide cover for armed groups to target vocal opponents with impunity.

International and local human rights organizations claim that human rights defenders and activists face continuing threats (including physical attacks, detention, threats, harassment, and disappearances) from armed groups aligned with and opposed to the GNA. Many armed groups aligned with the GNA or LNA maintain databases of persons being sought for their alleged opposition activities or due to their identity. Nongovernmental armed groups, terrorist groups, and individual civilians also regularly harass, intimidate, or assault journalists. Some journalists and human rights activists have chosen to depart the country rather than remain and endure harassment.

The international NGO Reporters without Borders reports that all sides use threats and violence to intimidate journalists. Harassment, threats, abductions, violence, and killings make it nearly impossible for media to operate in any meaningful capacity in areas of conflict.

HEALTH CONCERNS

EMERGENCY HEALTH SERVICES

The emergency line is 1515. Modern medical care and medicines may not be readily available throughout Libya. Libyans usually travel outside of the country for treatment of severe medical conditions.

Most Libyan healthcare providers only accept cash.

VACCINATIONS

Review the CDC Travellers' Health site for country-specific vaccine recommendations.

ISSUES TRAVELLING WITH MEDICATIONS

While pharmacies and medical centres are widely available throughout populated areas in Libya, medications (especially for rare conditions) may vary widely in availability and price. Travelers should bring sufficient medication for the duration of their stay in Libya.

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

The hot, dry, dust-laden Ghibli is a southern wind lasting one to four days in spring and fall. Dust storms and sandstorms are common. Air quality suffers as a result. Water pollution is a significant problem. The combined impact of sewage, oil by-products, and industrial waste threatens Libya's coast and the Mediterranean Sea.

CYBERSECURITY CONCERNS

The internet in Libya is heavily monitored by the Libyan Government, Militias, and Libyan Intelligence Services. Many bloggers, online journalists, and citizens report practicing self-censorship due to intimidation by armed groups and the uncertain political situation.

OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS

LANDMINES

Landmines, improvised explosive devices, and unspent ordinance and ammunition from numerous ground offensives are common around populated areas of Libya. Active disposal programs from the United Nations and other organizations are in progress, but the threat persists.

PHOTOGRAPHY

It is against the law to take photos of certain buildings, such as military and government facilities.

ID REQUIREMENTS

Libya does not have formal tourism industry infrastructure. You must always carry your passport with you, or militias could detain you for questioning. To travel to Libya you will require a travel visa to enter the country, only Arab and certain African nationals are exempt from this requirement.

Application for a visa must go to the Ministry of Interior and if you have anything resembling an Israeli stamp or evidence that you entered, left Jordan or Egypt via Israel, you won't be issued with a visa to enter Libya.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONCERNS

Libya suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation.

Libya suffers from desertification and has limited natural freshwater resources. "The Great Manmade River Project," the largest water development scheme in the world, brings water from large aquifers under the Sahara to coastal cities.

Although political and security instability in Libya has disrupted its telecommunications sector, much of its infrastructure remains superior to that of most other African countries. Selective filtering or blocking of internet access occurs, even though no reliable public information identified those responsible for censorship. There were no credible reports that the GNU restricted or disrupted internet access or monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority in 2019.

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

Libya maintains 112 embassies abroad as well as three consulates. The Libyan capital Tripoli hosts 48 embassies, and in addition there are 15 consulates in Libya.

[Libya - Embassies & Consulates \(embassypages.com\)](https://embassypages.com)

The Libya Embassy Pages were updated on 16 April 2022

USEFUL INFORMATION

List of holidays in Libya 2022

Date	Day	Name	Type
17 Feb	Thursday	Libyan Revolution Day	Public Holiday
1 May	Sunday	May Day	Public Holiday
2 May	Monday	Eid al-Fitr	Public Holiday
3 May	Tuesday	Eid al-Fitr Holiday	Public Holiday
4 May	Wednesday	Eid al-Fitr Holiday	Public Holiday
8 Jul	Friday	Day of Arafah	Public Holiday
9 Jul	Saturday	Eid al-Adha	Public Holiday
10 Jul	Sunday	Eid al-Adha	Public Holiday
11 Jul	Monday	Eid al-Adha	Public Holiday
30 Jul	Saturday	Muharram	Public Holiday
16 Sep	Friday	Martyrs' Day	Public Holiday
8 Oct	Saturday	The Prophet's Birthday	Public Holiday
23 Oct	Sunday	Liberation Day	Public Holiday
24 Dec	Saturday	Independence Day	Public Holiday

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All incident mapping & reporting within this report has been collated and sourced from Intelyse <https://intelyse.com>

HEADQUARTERS

Office 604, Fortune Executive Tower (T1), JLT, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

REGIONAL

Al Giran, Ghot Shal, Tripoli, Libya